The fair-dealing fiduciary rule:A comment on Barr v Cassels by Valsan, Remus
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fair-dealing fiduciary rule
Citation for published version:
Valsan, R 2019, 'The fair-dealing fiduciary rule: A comment on Barr v Cassels' Edinburgh Law Review, vol.
23, no. 1, pp. 89-94. DOI: 10.3366/elr.2019.0527
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3366/elr.2019.0527
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Edinburgh Law Review
Publisher Rights Statement:
This article has been accepted for publication by Edinburgh University Press in the Edinburgh Law Review , and
can be accessed at https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/full/10.3366/elr.2019.0527. 
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
The fair-dealing fiduciary rule: a comment on Barr v Cassels 
 
In Barr v Cassels1 the Outer House of the Court of Session examined the circumstances in 
which a transaction between solicitor and client triggers liability for breach of fiduciary duty 
and the equitable remedy of reduction. In a rather reserved analysis, the court allowed a 
conflicted transaction to stand even though the client received no independent legal advice 
and her informed consent was contested. The court reached this decision correctly, by 
applying the Aitken2 test and finding that the solicitor did not benefit at the expense of his 
client, and that there was no evidence that an independent solicitor would not have advised 
the transaction. The case was a missed opportunity for the court to clarify the extent of the 
solicitors’ common law duty to insist that clients receive independent legal advice before 
entering into a transaction with their solicitors, and align it with the updated and more 
demanding statutory practice rules.  
 
A. THE FACTS 
James Cassels (“the defender”) had acted as solicitor for the Barr family for several years, in 
a variety of matters. In 2003 the defender assisted Mr Barr in a conveyance of a parcel of 
land to his daughter, Agnes Barr (“the pursuer”). In 2006 the defender’s law firm acted as the 
pursuer’s solicitor in a transfer of the same plot of land from herself to the joint names of the 
pursuer and defender (“the disposition”). At the same time, the pursuer was sent an advice 
letter, explaining the substance of the disposition and strongly urging her to seek independent 
legal advice, accompanied by a waiver letter, to be returned in case she declined to take 
independent legal advice. Alongside their professional relationship, the pursuer and the 
defender had been engaged in a romantic relationship, and started a life together in a house 
built on the land transferred in their joint names. Several years later, the parties separated and 
in 2015 the defender was granted decree for division and sale of the heritable property. The 
pursuer filed an action seeking reduction of the disposition on grounds of misrepresentation, 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by the defender.3 She claimed that she was induced 
into signing the disposition by the defender’s misrepresentations,4 that the defender was in 
                                                          
1 [2018] CSOH 79 (“Cassels”). 
2 Aitken v Campbell’s Trustees 1909 SC 1217. 
3 Cassels, para [126]. 
4 Para [134]. 
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breach of fiduciary duty by placing himself in a position of conflict of interest,5 and that no 
solicitor of ordinary skill and care would have failed to convince the pursuer to seek 
independent legal advice.6 Moreover, she averred that she never intended to convey half of 
the property to the pursuer,7 and she never received or signed the advice and waiver letters.8  
 
B. THE COURT DECISION 
The court rejected the pursuer’s action on all grounds. The case for misrepresentation failed 
mainly due to the “very serious concerns”9 of the court about the credibility of the pursuer 
and her averments. Lady Wolffe found the pursuer “a largely incredible and unreliable 
witness”10 and gave no credit to her statements, unless they corroborated with more reliable 
evidence.11 The reasons for this included the pursuer’s past record of dishonest behaviour12 
and the material disjunctions between her evidence and her pleadings, particularly with 
regard to her alleged lack of awareness of the disposition13 and her claim that her signature 
on the waiver letter was a forgery.14 Instead, the court accepted the evidence of Allan 
Findlay, the solicitor who drafted the advice and waiver letters on behalf of the defender’s 
practice. Findlay confirmed that the letters reflected the defender’s instructions, but, due to 
the passage of time, he could only assume that he received back the signed waiver letter.15 
The court could only determine “as a matter of inference” that the pursuer signed the waiver 
letter and declined to take independent legal advice in full knowledge of the consequences.16 
Factors which contributed to such inference included the parties’ common intention to build a 
dwellinghouse and start a life together.17 Consequently, given the substantial concerns over 
the pursuer’s credibility and reliability, the court held that there was no misrepresentation 
from the defender regarding the substance and effect of the disposition.18 On the matter of 
                                                          
5 Para [157]. 
6 Para [161]. 
7 Para [25]. 
8 Para [33]. 
9 Para [132]. 
10 Para [133]. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Para [132]. 
13 Para [132.3]. 
14 Para [132.5]. 
15 Para [95]. 
16 Para [141]. 
17 Para [142]. 
18 Para [138]. 
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negligence, the court found that there was little evidence to support a contention that no 
reasonably competent solicitor would have failed to insist that the pursuer seek independent 
legal advice, or was otherwise bound to refuse to act.19  
 Regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court applied the test in Aitken v 
Campbell’s Trustees,20 according to which, when a solicitor deals with a client, the relevant 
question in establishing liability for breach of fiduciary duty is whether another solicitor 
would have advised the same transaction, or whether the solicitor would have advised the 
client to conclude the transaction with a third party.21 The court noted, rather cursorily, that 
there was no evidence that the Aitken test was met,22 and that the testimonies of both parties’ 
expert witnesses suggested that the transaction was fair and “pointed strongly away” from a 
finding of breach of fiduciary duty.23 In addition, the court clarified that breach of fiduciary 
duty and professional misconduct may arise from the same factual basis but are separate 
doctrines which should not be confused or assimilated.24 Finally, Lady Wolffe commented in 
obiter that, had the pursuer established the case for breach of fiduciary duty, the court would 
not have granted reduction of the disposition, mainly because the pursuer contributed 
substantially to the value of the property by financing the building and fitting of the house 
and contributing his expertise in obtaining the planning permissions.25  
 
C. ANALYSIS 
The fiduciary nature of the relation between the pursuer and the defender was not disputed. It 
is generally agreed that solicitor - client is a per se fiduciary relationship,26 where the main 
elements attracting the incidence of fiduciary duties are presumed to exist. Depending on the 
element which is regarded as the dominant cause of fiduciary duties, the existence of such 
duties in the case under review may be questioned. If trust and confidence reposed by the 
beneficiary or associated with a role are regarded as the most relevant indications of fiduciary 
                                                          
19 Para [161]. 
20 1909 SC 1217 
21 Ibid, 1227. 
22 Para [159]. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Paras [160]-[161]. 
25 Para [165]. 
26 Lionel Smith “Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgement on 
Behalf of Another” (2014) 130 Law Quarterly Review 608 at 618. 
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responsibility,27 it cannot be doubted that the defender owed fiduciary duties to the pursuer. 
He had been the trusted family solicitor for a long time, and, according to the pursuer’s 
testimony, she signed the documents because she trusted him.28 If the most significant 
indicator of fiduciary responsibility is the presence of decision-making authority over the best 
interests of the other party,29 the incidence of fiduciary duties in this case is less clear. The 
authority of the defender and his law firm was confined to the narrow task of implementing 
the conveyance as explained in the advice letter.30 It is not doubted that some agency 
relations are of such narrow scope that no fiduciary duties arise.31 Although this may have 
been the case here, both parties and the court worked under the unquestioned assumption that 
fiduciary duties were owed. Proceeding on that basis, it is clear that the defender was in an 
actual conflict of interest. He had a personal material interest which posed a risk to his ability 
to exercise independent professional judgment. Moreover, the sexual relationship with his 
client, while not a cause of strict liability, could be regarded as a non-pecuniary factor that 
had the potential to interfere with the reliability of his judgment and thus imperil his fiduciary 
duty.32  
It is well-established that, when a solicitor breaches the no-conflict rule by buying, 
selling or transferring property to or from his client, the contract can be reduced at the client’s 
option, unless the solicitor is able to show that “his client’s interests were as well protected as 
if they had been under the charge of an independent solicitor.”33 In Aitken v Campbell’s 
Trustees34 Lord President Dunedin stated that transactions between solicitor and client must 
be submitted to the “strictest scrutiny”35 and allowed only if the following questions could be 
                                                          
27See eg Laura Macgregor, The Law of Agency in Scotland (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2013) at 6-
13, 6-15.  
28 Para [15]. 
29 See eg Paul B Miller, “The Fiduciary Relationship” in Andrew Gold and Paul Miller, eds., 
Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 63 at 68; Remus Valsan, 
“Fiduciary Duties of Credit Brokers: McWilliam v Norton Finance” (2016) 21: 1 Edinburgh 
Law Review 99 at 103.  
30 Para [20]. The letter expressly stated that no advice was being offered to the pursuer, and 
directed the latter to seek independent advice in case of any doubts (ibid). 
31 Macgregor, note 27 at 6-12 [FN 102]; Valsan, note 29 at 103. 
32 This risk was noted by the defender’s expert: para [107.2]. 
33 Cleland v Morrison (1878) 6 R 156 at 172, per Lord Young. See also Rhodes v Bate (1866) 
LR 1 Ch 252 at 257, per Lord Turner; Barron v Willis (1902) AC 271 at 276, per Lord Earl of 
Halsbury; Rigg (Rigg's Executrix) v Urquhart (1902) 10 SLT 503 at 504 per Lord Stormonth 
Darling.  
34 1909 SC 1217. 
35 Ibid, 1225. 
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answered affirmatively: “would another law-agent have advised it, or if the proposition had 
been made by a third party, would this same law-agent have advised it to his own client?”36 
In Cassels the court endorsed this test, but did not elaborate on the kind of factual inquiries 
necessary to determine whether the test is met or not. Instead, it simply noted that, while 
“[t]here is no evidence to support a finding that the Aitken test was met”,37 the experts’ 
agreement that the disposition was not a gift or transfer at undervalue but one where full 
consideration was given, was a strong indication that the disposition passed the test.38 
The extent of the defender’s duty in response to the pursuer’s waiver of her right to 
take independent advice was a matter of controversy. While the pursuer’s expert believed that 
the defender breached his duty of care by failing to insist on the taking of independent advice, 
which was “the only proper course”,39 Lady Wolffe was of the view that the text of the 
Solicitors Code of Conduct 2002 (applicable at the time of the disposal) allowed for a more 
flexible approach. The relevant passage stated that 
Where solicitors are consulted about matters in which they have a personal or 
financial interest the position should be made clear to the clients and where 
appropriate solicitors should insist that the clients consult other solicitors.40    
In her view, the words “where appropriate” and “should” do not necessarily imply that a 
reasonable solicitor exercising due skill and care would always insist on independent legal 
advice or abstain from acting.41 Consequently, she endorsed the opinion of the defender’s 
expert, according to whom the advice and waiver letters sufficed, given the adequacy of 
consideration and the parties’ intention to use the property as a family home.42  
 This interpretation, although justified on the basis of the 2002 Code, is not tenable 
under the current version of the Code. Section B 1.8 of the 2011 Practice Rules explicitly 
stipulate that where the solicitor or her practice unit have a personal or financial interest in a 
matter in which they are consulted, so that they cannot reasonably give independent advice, 
they “must decline to act and advise the client to seek appropriate advice elsewhere.”43 This 
unqualified duty to advise the client to seek independent legal advice seemingly aligns Scots 
law with the English law approach, which “takes it as read that the client must receive 
                                                          
36 Ibid, 1227, referring to Gillespie & Sons v Gardner 1909 SC 1053 at 1061-1062, per Lord 
President Dunedin. 
37 Para [159]. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Para [48]. 
40 Para [59], emphasis added. 
41 Para [161].  
42 Paras [116] and [161]. 
43 Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011, section B.1.8, “Disclosure of Interest”. 
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independent advice from a solicitor unconnected with his or her own solicitor, who is in full 
possession of all materials facts known to that solicitor.”44 The current version of the Rules 
highlights that the core concern in a situation of conflict of interest is a risk regarding the 
solicitor’s ability to exercise independent and unencumbered judgment,45 which is a matter 
than cannot be assessed based on the outcome (fairness) of the conflicted transaction.46 This 
insight applies more generally to the fair-dealing rule binding on all fiduciaries. The true 
concern of the fair-dealing rule must be linked with the underlying rationale of the no-conflict 
rule as a whole, and with the principle that only fully informed consent can immunise against 
liability.47 
 Understandably, the Lord Ordinary limited her analysis to the relevant tests and 
professional conduct rules applicable at the time of the disposition. At the same time, in light 
of the disagreements between the parties’ expert opinions, and considering the subsequent 
development of the Practice Rules as well as the general legal regime applicable to the 
fiduciary no-conflict and fair-dealing rules, it would have been useful if the court 
commented, albeit in obiter, on the current common law position on the extent of the 
solicitors’ duty to insist that their clients obtain independent legal advice or abstain from 
entering into a conflict of interest transaction.  
Remus Valsan 
University of Edinburgh 
 
   
                                                          
44 Longstaff v Birtles [2001] 1 WLR 470 at 477, per Mummery LJ. See also Bruce Ritchie 
and Alan Paterson, Law, Practice and Conduct for Solicitors (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2014) 
8.04. 
45 For further arguments that this is the main concern of the fiduciary no-conflict rule see 
Lionel Smith, “Deterrence, Prophylaxis and Punishment in Fiduciary Obligations” (2013) 7 
Journal of Equity 87 at 98. 
46 Remus Valsan, “Fiduciary Duties, Conflict of Interest and Proper Exercise of Judgment” 
(2016) 62:1 McGill Law Journal 1 at 31. 
47 Matthew Conaglen, “Re-Appraisal of the Fiduciary Self-Dealing and Fair-Dealing Rules” 
(2006) 65:2 Cambridge Law Journal 366 at 374. 
